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CORRECTIONS TO APPELLEES' STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellees' Statement of the Case on pages 1 through 7 of
their opposing brief is generally correct.

However, it does

contain certain highly inaccurate and misleading statements.

On

page two, bottom, page three top, thereof, the Appellees state
that " . . .

Johnson-Bowles offered to purchase . . . U.S.A.

Medical stock from Utah citizens . . . ."
belied by the Appellees' own brief.

This is fundamentally

In the last sentence of 16,

page 12 of Appellees' Appendix "A" to their brief, the Appellees
themselves held, on August 13, 1990, that Johnson-Bowles did not
offer to purchase any stock from anyone after the Division's
March 1, 1989, suspension Order went into effect.
added.]

[Emphasis

This brazen inconsistency evidences that the Division's

case, as it has itself articulated it, makes little, if any,
sense.

For instance, if the Division's administrative

adjudicative proceedings are and have been predicated on
Appellants' having violated Utah Code Ann. §61-1-6(1)(g) -because Johnson-Bowles allegedly "solicited" or "encouraged" or
otherwise "aided" in the violation of §61-1-7 of the Act -- the
Appellees by their own Findings of Fact in their August 13,
Order, make it impossible to have violated §61-1-6(1)(g) on that
basis.
The Appellees further misstate the clear meaning and
intendment of the applicable Department of Commerce rule in
issue.

On page 5 of the Appellees' brief, the Appellees contend

-1 -

that Department of Commerce Rule R151-46B-12D contemplates that
an "order" on agency review is to issue 20 days after the "last
responsive pleading" is filed.
law.

This is neither the rule nor the

The Division was required by law to issue an order on

agency review 20 days after September 26, 1989, and there is no
question that it abjectly failed to do so.

The Appellees' entire

opposing brief presupposes a complete misreading of the
applicable Department of Commerce Rule and thus begs the question
of how this Court should decide this case.
Lastly, the Appellees assert that Appellants'
registrations with the Division have now been suspended for one
(1) year as a result of the August 13, 1990, Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order thereon.
Appellees' Brief.)

(See Appendix "A" to

This is also false in that Department of

Commerce Executive Director David L. Buhler is presently
reviewing the entire administrative proceedings and such review
suspends the operation of the Appellees1 August 13, 1990, Order.
In short, Appellants are not yet guilty of anything other than
doing everything available to them to protect themselves and
their livelihoods.
REBUTTAL IF APPELLEES' ARGUMENTS
COUNTER-ARGUMENT I
APPELLANTS DID NOT MISLEAD THE LOWER COURT IN THEIR
PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY WRIT.

ON THE CONTRARY, THE APPELLEES,

IN ORDER TO PREVENT ANY REVIEW OF THE ALJ'S AUGUST 29, 1989,
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ORDER AND PREVENT ANY DISPOSITIVE RESOLUTION OF THE PROCEEDINGS
AT THAT STAGE, DELIBERATELY MISLEAD THE LOWER COURT EX PARTE.
The Appellees contend that Appellants somehow
"hookwinked" the lower court into granting extraordinary relief
by failing to disclose in their October 27, 1989, Petition
nothing more than the Division's own unilateral interpretation of
Department of Commerce Rule R151-46B-12 -- a convenient "Division
interpretation" that Appellants lacked the omniscience to be
aware of in advance.

On the contrary, a request for agency

review had been sought by Appellants on September 11, and the
Division's counsel, not the Division itself, filed a responsive
pleading on September 26.

The fact is that no order on agency

review had issued from the Division nor had any other
communication been received from the Division itself -- not its
counsel

-- as required under the applicable rule.

Certainly the

Division's counsel is not the alter ego of the Division.

The

procedural reality is that Appellees themselves mislead the lower
court by informing the lower court that their counsel's own
"responsive pleading" was tantamount to or otherwise excused the
Division's legal obligation to issue an order on agency review.
COUNTER-ARGUMENT II
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE
DIVISION'S FAILURES WERE ANYTHING BUT DISCRETIONARY.
Throughout Appellees* opposing brief, Appellees
presuppose that the Department of Commerce Rule in issue is

-3-

discretionary.

Because the rule has a 20 day requirement and

triggering mechanism for the issuance of an order on agency
review, there is nothing discretionary about it.

After

soliciting this Court to follow their erroneous presuppositions,
the Appellees attempt to distinguish Appellants' reliance on
Aluminum Company of America v. ICC, 761 F.2d 746
(D.C. Cir. 1985)(then Judge Scalia).

However, the factual

differences between Aluminum Company and this case has no bearing
on Aluminum Company's legal holding.

Specifically, Aluminum

Company stands for the unambiguous proposition that a government
agency must abide by its own rules and seeking an extraordinary
writ in the district court to compel an agency to comply with the
law is the appropriate remedy.

Whether the order at issue is

interlocutory or final is neither the issue in this case nor in
Aluminum Company.

The issue in Aluminum Company, as in this

case, is that the government agency failed to comply with its own
non-discretionary rules.
Throughout the Appellees' memorandum, the Appellees
further argue that the ALJ's August 29, 1989, order from which
agency review was sought on September 11, 1989, was
"interlocutory".

Whether such order was interlocutory is one of

opinion and it does not excuse the Division from failing to
comply with law requiring affirmative conduct on its part.

Such

rule, by its own language, simply says and contemplates review of
an "order" as does §12 of the UAPA.

-4-

The decision the Court

should render in this case is that if an agency fails to comply
with its own rules (i.e., the law), the relief sought by those
like Appellants should be granted by default.

This is because an

agency should be penalized for stalling the just and efficient
resolution of an administrative adjudicative proceeding,
particularly when the respondent is hamstrung in the agency's
self-serving forum and such person's livelihood and
constitutional rights are at stake.

Thus, because the Division

failed to act, the request for agency review in issue should have
been granted and/or the order should have been certified as
"final" for immediate judicial review.

Otherwise, persons like

Appellants would be inextricated endlessly and unfairly in the
administrative adjudicative arena as has unfortunately and
unnecessarily occurred in this case.

Belaboring the distinction

of "final" versus "interlocutory" when discretion to issue an
order on agency review is not the issue in this case is simply
putting the cart before the horse.
Appellees' argument that Appellants should have
apparently sought extraordinary relief in the Court of Appeals
further miscomprehends what is going on in this case.

A general

jurisdiction district court of the State of Utah certainly has
the power and authority to compel a Utah administrative agency to
obey the law.
(Utah 1980).

Wright v. City of Wellsville, 608 P.2d 232, 233-34
There is no reason on earth why Appellants should

have sought an extraordinary writ in the Court of Appeals and had

-5-

they done so, they would have had no legal basis therefor.
Simply because the Division changed its mind and converted the
proceedings from "formal" to "informal" -- ignoring its own
sub-agency rules that such proceedings are always designated as
informal1 -- does not lead to the conclusion that in this case,
only the Court of Appeals would have had jurisdiction to make the
Division abide by the law.
The Appellees' failure to abide by the very rules
governing them is certainly arbitrary and capricious.

In Wright

v. City of Wellsville, supra at 233-34, the Utah Supreme Court
held that mandamus allows courts to intrude into or interfere
with functions or policies of other departments of government if
such body has acted capriciously and arbitrarily.

Accord:

Ledbetter v. Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enforcement
Commission, 764 P.2d 172, 180 (Sup. Ct. Okla. 1988).

Contrary to

what Appellees assert, the case at bar does not involve policy,
but rules -- rules which are not to be enforced capriciously and
arbitrarily as Appellees have done.
In All Purpose Vending, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia,
561 A.2d 1309, 1311 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 1989), a case cited by
Appellees, the Court held that the existence of substantial

1

At the time the Division's petitions were filed in
April 1989, the Division's administrative adjudicative
proceedings under R177-6-lg, "Dishonest or Unethical Business
Practices", were expressly designated as "informal". The
Division amended its rules effective, July 1, 1990, at Blue Sky
L. Rep., Vol. 3, (CCH) 157,403, pp. 50,508-511.

-6-

questions of constitutionality and the absence of adequate
statutorily prescribed remedies, confers equity jurisdiction on a
court.

Accord:

Ledbetter, supra at 180.

In this case, there

were no statutory remedies available to Appellants and the
Constitutional questions raised by Appellants in the lower court
with regard to federal pre-emption and the inherent conflict of
Appellants' admini ~rative prosecutors, judges, and jurors are
substantial enough that the lower court indeed had jurisdiction
to address them.

Unfortunately, the lower court did not and

therefore, this appeal exists.
The issue in this case is not Appellants' failure to
exhaust administrative remedies as Appellees would want this
court to believe.

Merrihew v. Salt Lake County Planning and

Zoning Commission, 659 P.2d 1065, 1967 (Utah 1983).

On the

contrary, Appellants were pursuing all administrative remedies
available to them.
sufficient.

The problem is that such remedies weren't

This, coupled with Appellees' "do-nothing" judicial

attitude prejudicing Appellants, forced Appellants to do what
they did in an attempt to fully resolve the proceedings quickly
and otherwise protect themselves and their livelihoods.
In sum, the Division would have had to act
properly -- or at least within its discretion -- for mandamus not
to lie in the district court.

Ingram-Clevenger, Inc. v. Lewis

and Clark County, 636 P.2d 1372, 1374 (Sup. Ct. Mont.
1981)(holding that if there has been an abuse of discretion
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amounting to no exercise of discretion at all, mandamus will lie
to compel proper exercise of powers granted); Olsen v. Salt Lake
City School District, 724 P.2d 960, 39 Ut. Adv. Rep. 39, 42
(Sup. Ct. 1986)(holding that where the law imposes limitations on
the exercise of discretion, mandamus is available to enforce
those limitations).

In this case, it was improper for the

Division to disregard and ignore its own rules only to prejudice
Appellants.

Under the circumstances, the Division had no

discretion to keep Appellants from doing whatever they could to
resolve the proceedings according to the very law governing the
Division.

Thus, the district court indeed had jurisdiction to

expedite or resolve the proceedings.

This is not to ignore that

the district court itself abused its discretion in not
reinstating the extraordinary writ, and therefore it can and
should be reversed on appeal.

Garcia v. City of South Tucson,

663 P.2d 596, 598 (Ariz. App. 1983).

In fact, because there was

no impossibility of performance on the part of the Division, the
district court erred in not reinstating the extraordinary writ.
Garcia, supra at 598.
COUNTER-ARGUMENT III
WHETHER THE ALJ'S ORDER FROM WHICH AGENCY REVIEW WAS
SOUGHT WAS "INTERLOCUTORY" OR "FINAL" IS IRRELEVANT TO THIS
APPEAL AND THE MERITS HEREOF BECAUSE SUCH REVIEW HAS A
"SUBSTANTIAL EFFECT UPON THE ULTIMATE OUTCOME OF THE
PROCEEDINGS"-

-8-

The Appellees have cited several cases in their brief,
which, if examined, readily support Appellants' appeal on the
merits.

In In Re Uniform Administrative Procedure Rules, 90 N.J.

85, 447 A.2d 151 (Sup. Ct. 1982), the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that there is nothing improper about reviewing a so-called
"interlocutory order" if it has "a substantial effect upon the
ultimate outcome of the proceedings", ^d. at 158-159.

In this

case, if it could have been quickly established that the Division
lacked jurisdiction to discipline Appellants simply for complying
with their concomitant federal obligations, the case would have
been disposed of summarily as opposed to Vh years of pointless
litigation, substantial pain and suffering, and thousands and
thousands of dollars later.

Unfortunately, the Division wanted

its pound of flesh and wasn't interested in learning that it may
have lacked jurisdiction.

In fact, the Appellees' conduct and

arrogant attitude brings to mind the words of philosopher Herbert
Spencer:
There is a principle which is a bar against
all information, which is proof against all
arguments and which cannot fail to keep man in
everlasting ignorance -- that principle
is
contempt prior to investigation.2
Based on the foregoing, whether the ALJ's order was
"interlocutory" or not is irrelevant to the disposition of this
case, an argument comprising virtually all of Appellees' brief.
2

Source: The "Big Book" of Alcoholics Anonymous,
Alcoholics Anonymous World Wide Services, Inc., Third Edition,
New York City, 1976, p. 570.
-9-

COUNTER-ARGUMENT IV
IF THIS APPEAL WERE MOOT, THERE NEVER WOULD OR EVER
COULD BE A DECISION INTERPRETING §12, UAPA, OR ANY COROLLARY
AGENCY RULE.
The Division argues that this appeal is moot because, if
the lower court were reversed and it were required to reinstate
the extraordinary writ, the relief that would result is that
which is in the very process of presently occurring, namely,
agency review by the executive director of the Department of
Commerce.

The argument ignores the fact that had the Division or

the Court of Appeals reviewed Appellants' Rule 12(b)(1) motion
and the ALJ's August 29, 1989, Order relative thereto, the
proceedings may have not gone any further and required the
enormous amount of time, energy and money spent by all the
parties, including the taxpayers of Utah.

To the extent the

failure to address the ALJ's August 29, "order" was a mistake,
Appellants have been severely damaged and a ruling reversing the
ALJ would have dispensed with all that has occurred relentlessly
between now and then, including Appellants' forthcoming appeal to
this Court of the entire administrative adjudicative proceedings.
Thus, a ruling from this Court on the merits is in the interests
of judicial economy and will save this very Court from but
another lengthy and far more protracted, complicated, and time
consuming decision to render.

A proper resolution of this appeal

will thus obviate additional appeals to this very Court.

-10-

Moreover, in the event Appellants do not get a favorable ruling
from Executive Director Buhler and they seek judicial review
under §16, UAPA, Appellants will more than likely move to
consolidate this appeal with the forthcoming appeal of the entire
administrative adjudicative proceedings.

If such occurs, this

Court can address all of the issues presented in both appeals and
by virtue of this appeal, it will be able to see the entire
picture of what has arbitrarily and capriciously transpired.
If this appeal is moot, it also means that there would
never be an appellate decision in Utah interpreting §12, UAPA.
This is because under the practicalities of administrative and
judicial appellate procedure, an administrative proceeding would
clearly be resolved by the administrative agency prior to the
time a judicial appeal is heard and ruled upon.

Appellants

submit that it was never the intention of the legislature or our
legal system in general to render certain statutes unreviewable
and uninterpretable by an appellate court as a matter of law.
Yet this is precisely the Appellees' argument.

Furthermore, if

this appeal is indeed moot, why wasn't the very same issue on
appeal in Aluminum Company moot for the same reasons, the very
issue addressed first and foremost by then Judge Scalia?
COUNTER-ARGUMENT V
THE APPELLEES' OPPOSING BRIEF IS NON-RESPONSIVE TO
APPELLANTS' BRIEF AND TOTALLY IGNORES THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND

- 11 -

MERITS ISSUES OVER WHICH THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION AND WHICH
ARE NOW RIPE TO DECIDE.
Without reiterating Appellants' Constitutional and other
issues relative to the merits of their September 11, 1989,
request for agency review, the Appellees have neglected to even
refer in passing to such issues in their opposing brief.
Furthermore, because the Appellees have lodged no objection to
addressing the ALJ's August 29, 1989, Order on the merits, they
have certainly opened the door, if not encouraged, this Court to
address such in their entirety.

Further, to save the time and

expense of a forthcoming appeal of the entire administrative
adjudicative proceedings, this Court would be well advised in the
interests of its own time and that of the parties to review the
ALJ's Order on its merits in this appeal.
There is also authority that an appellate court has
authority to modify a judgment in a mandamus proceeding.

Cain v.

The Department of Health and Environmental Sciences, 582 P.2d
332, 335 (Sup. Ct. Mont. 1978).

Accordingly, this Court has the

ability to rule on the merits of both Appellants' Constitutional
arguments before the lower court and those in their request for
agency review, all as set forth in their Brief, if only to
prevent further costly and wholly unnecessary litigation between
the parties, including further appeals.
COUNTER-ARGUMENT VI

- 12-

THIS APPEAL IS NOT FRIVOLOUS BECAUSE APPELLANTS' ENTIRE
LIVELIHOODS ARE AND HAVE BEEN AT STAKE AND WHEN CITIZENS ARE
INEXTRICATED INTO A MALICIOUS AND POINTLESS ADMINISTRATIVE
ADJUDICATIVE PROCESS THREATENING THEIR VERY SURVIVAL, THEY HAVE
EVERY RIGHT TO DO WHATEVER IS NECESSARY TO PROTECT THEMSELVES.
Appellants have been in the securities brokerage
business for over 15 years.
thousands of customers.

They have had thousands and

As a result of the Division's pointless

proceedings,3 designed merely to teach the world that, according

3

The point of the Division's administrative adjudicative
proceedings is and has been no less spectacular than to create a
legal precedent that one who simply buys unregistered, non-exempt
securities (for whatever reason) is guilty of aiding and abetting
the unlawful sale thereof. [Emphasis added.] This Division
obsession is legally ridiculous in that it creates a strict
liability, in pari delicto defense to the offer and sale of
unregistered, non-exempt securities by professional stock
swindlers or anyone else. In fact, what is so remarkable is that
on June 15, 1988, the U.S. Supreme Court already rejected, in
this very context, the "substantial factor" test (one of the
components of the three prong aiding and abetting test) in Pinter
v. Dahl, [ ' 87-' 88 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
193,790.
Without being facetious, the other point made by the
Division's proceedings is that "crime does pay." For instance,
on September 7, 1990, U.S. District Judge David Sam, in the case
of United States v. James Lynn Averett, Case No. 90-CR-129S,
sentenced Utah attorney James L. Averett to mere probation for
having pleaded guilty to the felony of criminal conspiracy
relative to his direct involvement in the U.S.A. Medical stock
fraud and market manipulation. By sharp comparison, it is
undisputed that Appellants single-handedly exposed the entire
U.S.A. Medical fraud and market manipulation in U.S. District
Judge Greene's court at February end, 1989. As their reward for
doing the government's work, Appellants have had a determination
by Appellees that their registrations with the Division be
revoked for a year, an additional two year probationary period,
and, as a result, their entire business and reputations have been
-13-

to the Division, securities broker-dealers shouldn't honor
conflicting and pre-existing federal, SEC and NASD obligations,
Appellants' business and livelihoods have now been destroyed.

To

be sure, in simply complying with their overriding SEC and NASD
obligations and responsibilities, Appellants are, thanks to the
Division, out of business -- without even a just resolution of
these proceedings.

For instance, based on the pendency of these

proceedings, Appellants have had to withdraw their NASD
registrations and a valuable trader, who brought in nearly a
million dollars a year in income, has left the firm.

Appellant

Johnson is now out of work after having operated a successful
brokerage firm with, at one time, up to 20 employees.

Several of

such employees have also been put out of work and have had to
seek other, less promising employment.

There is thus nothing

frivolous about the chaos and havoc the Division has raised in
the lives of Appellants and those of their former employees just
to make a point that never had to be made in the first place.
Certainly there is nothing frivolous about doing what a person
has to do to protect himself and his or her very existence,

destroyed. Thus, the lesson learned from the Division is that it
pays for a broker-dealer to participate directly in a securities
fraud and market manipulation by directly and secretly buying
stock from those directly involved in the scheme as opposed to
doing what Appellants did, namely, what is known in the industry
as "whistleblowing". To be sure, the Division's position is
contrary to SEC v. Dirks, (U.S. Supreme Court) (July 1, 1983)
['82-'83 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 199,255, n. 8,
p. 96,124.
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including seeking to expedite the proper resolution of
administrative adjudicative proceedings through extraordinary
relief.

The Appellees' flippant view of their power and ability

to destroy peoples1 lives and reputations, as if they were
spending their own money, not someone else's in the process, is
certainly anything but frivolous.
The irony of this case is that the Division licenses
16,833 agents, 763 broker-dealers, and 91 investment advisors.4
At the same time, the Division has admittedly done little more
since April 27, 1989, than pursue Appellants with a vengeance,5
simply for complying with their federal, SEC and NASD
obligations.

If the Appellants' defense to such pointless

proceedings is itself frivolous, then perhaps no one should
engage in the securities brokerage business, or any other

4

Source: The Commerce Quarterly published by the Utah
Department of Commerce, August, 1990, an article ironically
entitled, of all things, "Division Mission".
5

The Division's excuse as to why it hasn't prosecuted
virtually anyone else in the last year and a half over anything
is that it has been admittedly concentrating on putting
Appellants herein out-of-business. For instance, the Division,
in 1989, filed an action against registered agent Paul Jones, a
securities broker who sold U.S.A. Medical-stock to Appellants in
direct violation of the Division's March 1989, Orders. Yet
instead of moving for summary judgment against Mr. Jones in the
last year and a half -- a rather facile endeavor requiring a one
page supporting memorandum -- the Division has busied itself, at
the taxpayers' expense, pursuing Appellants for honoring their
overriding federal obligations, -conduct on the part of Appellants
that ironically did not result in the distribution of any
U.S.A. Medical stock to any Utah residents -- the only avowed
goal of the Division's March 1989, Orders, and which it is
undisputed that Mr. Jones, not Appellants
-15-

business regulated by government, and everyone should just quit,
go home, and watch cable television.

To be sure, this state has

a deplorable reputation for securities fraud.6

Yet, the Division

sees fit to single-out these two Appellants as the only persons
it regulates and seek an unlawful $50,000 "fine" for the last llA
years -- not for engaging in securities fraud -- but for buying
worthless stock which was not redistributed to Utah residents,
stock used solely by Appellants to honor pre-existing Exchange
Act contracts and insure that those to whom Appellants previously
owed stock out of this state, would not lose several hundred
thousand dollars.
The Division's cry and hue of the frivolousness of this
appeal brings to mind what is presently occurring in RICO
litigation across this nation.

In the well-known and cited RICO

case of Wabash Valley Power Association, Inc. v. Public Service
Company of Indiana, Inc., 67 8 F.Supp. 757, 761 n.l

6

See e.cf. , The "Stock-Fraud" Capital Tries To Clean Up
Its Act, Business Week, February 6, 1984, at 76. ("[Utah] is now
known as the sewer of the securities industry. The SEC estimates
that some 10,000 state residents lost up to $700 million through
unregistered securities, fraud and flagrant mismanagement over
the past three or four years."); Utah Investors Said to Lose $125
Million In Securities Scam, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 5, 1984 at
42. Regardless of Utah's reputation for securities fraud, it is
significant that in the case at bar, not one single, solitary
Utah resident was in the least damaged by the conduct of
Appellants in complying with U.S. District Judge Greene's ruling
and in otherwise acting with integrity and commercial honor to
protect those out-of-state broker-dealers and clearing
corporations to whom they owed U.S.A. Medical stock prior to
March 1, 1989.
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(S.D. Ind. 1988), the Court stated:
This Court's research reveals that it has
become standard practice for RICO defendants
to allege lack of specificity. This Court
takes a dim view of this litigation strategy
because it tends to delay, rather than
enhance, a resolution of a RICO claim. For
example, in this case, PSI filed an answer to
WVPA's original complaint. When WVPA amended
its complaint to add its RICO claim, WVPA
incorporated its prior allegations into its
RICO claim. Suddenly, however, the PSI were
unable to answer because of lack of
specificity.
By the same token, it has become standard practice to allege
frivolousness in appeals and everywhere else.

The Division,

which in this appeal chose not to file a motion for summary
disposition, is using no different and no less pitiable of a
tactic with respect to frivolousness.

Such charges, as with

those in Wabash, do not resolve the dispute in issue. Certainly,
if Appellants are dragged through the another malicious
administrative process as the Division has vindictively
threatened, Appellants are entitled to a proper and just
interpretation of §12, UAPA, and the corollary rule, inasmuch as
none presently exists.

For these reasons, this appeal is far

from frivolous and this Court should take a similar "dim view" of
such "standard practice".
Lastly, if this appeal is frivolous, one has to explain
away why the district court, after being well advised, granted
Appellants' Petition for Extraordinary Writ in the first place on
October 27, 1989. Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 125 Ut. Adv. Rep.
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23y 25 (Sup. Ct. 1990)(one of reasons appeal lacked merit was
fact of losing on summary judgment so resoundingly in lower
court).
CONCLUSION
This case, contrary to what Appellees assert, is about
false pride, the false pride of a government agency that has no
interest whatsoever in discovering if it is acting in error and
which uses its own little forum to foist the personal agendas of
its personnel on those it regulates,

what this case is about is

a government agency which brought an action against but two of
its nearly 17,500 licensees because it "heard" -- through
unreliable sources which included convicted securities felons -that Appellants made several hundred thousand dollars "covering"
their "short" positions in certain unregistered securities.

Yet

when the Division and its counsel eventually learned that
Appellants hadn't made a "fortune" (i.e., that Appellants made
just over $6,000 and had spent well over $100,000 in attorney's
fees alone) and that Appellants wouldn't (or couldn't, even if
they wanted to) pay the Division a $50,000 unlawful "fine" to
settle the matter,7 it was too late to bow out gracefully and

1

When the proceedings were initially brought against
Appellants in April 1989, Utah Code Ann. §61-1-6 did not confer
any power or authority on the Division to extract fines from its
licensees. As a result of these proceedings and the Division's
embarrassment at trying to extract a $50,000 fine from Appellants
which they had no authority to do, the Division lobbied the
legislature and such statute was amended, effective April 23,
-18-

dismiss the proceedings.

Then, in a concerted effort to

perpetuate such proceedings and "cover" its own embarrassment and
indiscretion at not reasonably investigating in advance -- and
also because Appellants had the "audacity" to resist the
proceedings -- the Division embarked on a campaign to put
Appellants, and no one else, out-of-business no matter what the
cost to the taxpayer or anyone else.
One would think that a government agency would want to
know whether it had jurisdiction to regulate citizens in a manner
diametrically inconsistent with its licensees' simultaneous
obligations under federal law.

However, instead of being the

least bit interested in resolving this rather paramount,
preliminary issue, the Division sought to "string" the
proceedings out endlessly in its own little forum, hoping that
Appellants would get tired of the cost and expense and eventually
capitulate to a sanction, thereby justifying the Division's
"noble" efforts to allegedly "protect the public" from, of all
people, those like Appellants.
At issue here is whether Appellants had the right to get
the case disposed of summarily and quickly and whether the
Division should want to know if it indeed had jurisdiction to
requlate Appellants in a manner antithetical to federal rules and

1990, to allow the director to impose a fine at his or her
discretion. See Utah Code Ann. §61-1-6(1), as amended, p. 5,
top, of 19 90 Supplement.
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regulations.8

Appellants believe that this issue should have

been submitted to an impartial reviewing officer without delay or
Appellants should have at least been permitted to pursue the
issue quickly and effectively with the appropriate appellate
court, either by way of extraordinary writ or otherwise. What
this case is about is creating precedent that either an agency or
the courts ought to review dispositive matters under §12, UAPA,
or the corollary rule.
Appellants have been told that administrative
adjudicative proceedings were designed with the intent that
disposition in such forums would be cheaper, more efficient, and
certainly more cost-effective.

Yet the administrative

adjudicative proceedings in issue are a monument to the fact that
this is anything but the case, that Appellants could have
litigated the entire matter in district court or elsewhere at
half the cost in time, energy, money and mutual animosity.

This

Court should rule that the Division should have heard the
Appellants' dispositive request for agency review or certified
the same for judicial appeal as Judge Sawaya originally ordered.
At the same time, this Court should dismiss the administrative
8
See this very Court's decision in Western Capital &
Securities, Inc. v. Kundsvig, 799 P.2d 688, 113 Utah
Adv. Rep. 53, (Ct. App., February 7, 1989), [1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 194,337. The Court should also
note Rule 302 of the Utah Rules of Evidence which provides: "In
civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumption
respecting a fact which is an element of a claim or defense as to
which federal law supplies the rule of decision is determined in
accordance with federal law." [Emphasis added.]
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adjudicative proceedings in their entirety in that Appellees'
amended petitions were pre-empted under federal securities law.
Further, this Court should decide that the proceedings are and
have been unconstitutional because Appellants have been pursued
by those acting as prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner -all at the same time.

These are sufficient grounds to dismiss

the proceedings in their entirety and make any and all other
rulings prayed for in Appellants' Brief.
DATED this 24th day of September, 1990
Resibec/tfuy\fyjksu]cfnitt
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John^L£ftafe3f Cttofnos
Cnaig F . McCullough
Attorney for Appellants
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